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Abstract. This article considers what happened to American anthropology, which 
was initiated by the scientist Franz Boas, who commanded all fields of anthropology, 
physical, biological, and cultural. Boas was a brave field worker who explored 
Eskimo land, and inspired two famous students, Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead, 
to cross borders in new kinds of studies. After this florescence, there was a general 
return to linear descriptive positivism, superficial comparisons of quantitative 
cultural traits, and false evolutionary schemes, which did not introduce us to the 
personalities and inner worlds of the tribal peoples studied. The 1953 study by the 
philosopher David Bidney was a revelation. Bidney enunciated and clarified all my 
doubts about the paths of anthropology and his work became to some extent a 
model for a narration of the story of American anthropology. In many ways he 
envisaged a semiotics of culture formulated by Lotman. I try to illustrate the fallacies 
listed by Bidney and how they have been partially overcome in some later 
anthropological studies which have focused on symbolism, artistry, and subjective 
qualities of the people studied. I then try to give an overview of the school started by 
Lotman that spans all human behavior, that demonstrates the complexity of 
meaning and communication, in vast areas of knowledge, from art, literature, 
science, and philosophy, that abjured strict relativism and closed systems and has 
become an inspiration for those who want anthropology to encompass the self and 
the other, and Bahtin’s double meaning. This paper was inspired by Bidney as a call 
to explore widely all possible worlds, not to abandon science and reality but to 
explore deeper inner interrelations and how the aesthetic may be indeed be 
paramount in the complexities of communication. 
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Part 1 
 
1.1. Introduction: Bidney’s Theoretical Anthropology 
 
How did I begin this essay? The subtitle of the March 2005 issue of the 
American Anthropologist (107/1) was Ethnographic Emergences. This 
sparked a memory of a book that fascinated me years ago by the 
philosopher David Bidney, entitled Theoretical Anthropology (1967, 
first published in 1953). Bidney’s core word was “emergences”. I was 
then inspired to reflect on some of Bidney’s far-sighted critiques and 
arguments, many of which foreshadowed the perspectives of the 
growing semiotic movements. 
Why had I never heard that phrase “emergences” in the remarks of 
the professors at Columbia where I was a student, and the university 
that, thanks to Franz Boas, had founded the first department of 
anthropology? While Boas was a brilliant and inventive master of all 
aspects of anthropology, his work was soon ignored with some excep-
tions until recently. Bidney’s evaluations were also ignored by 
anthropologists with the exception of Kroeber. Indeed, after the virtual 
fluorescence of creativity by two of Boas’ students: Margaret Mead, 
who had the courage to embark on fieldwork alone at the age of 
twenty-five in Oceania, who had the gift of empathy and creativity to 
perceive and translate the gestures and beliefs of three different groups, 
and the second student, Ruth Benedict, who was indeed a philosopher 
and poet as well as an anthropologist. She saw as a metaphor a 
Neitchian tint in the worldview of the plains Indians and she poetically 
depicted the Zuni as Apollonian. Such contributions enrich our minds 
whether or not they are epistemologically real, in Searle’s terminology.   
But the work of these two gifted individuals originally celebrated, 
nevertheless with some exceptions, were neglected for decades for 
tired methodologies, positivist and descriptive and static portraits 
which omitted the history of the various tribal groups, which were 
distilled in isolation as in a museum and were depicted as retaining 
their cultures as frozen, and incorrect evolutionary schemes presumed 
to be universal.  
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Boas’ great contributions were hardly examined by the growing 
new field of anthropologists, although Boas liberated cultural theory 
from the strict, unsubstantiated linear evolutionary rules proposed by 
Morgan and Spencer. Boas was incorrectly called anti-historical, 
although he upheld the importance of historical evidence of primitive 
peoples, in so far as it could be substantiated from myths, memories, 
and some artifacts. Indeed, while Darwin collected quantities of em-
pirical data to support his emerging theory of diversity in evolution, 
nevertheless the myth of unilineal evolution continued to be taken 
seriously by many. Thus the early heritage was distorted with few 
exceptions. Boas courageously broke down myths and stereotypes 
concerning racial and ethnic traits and false evolutionary beliefs, and 
showed for example, that any language could be learned by any infant, 
thus there was no universal evolutionary path for language develop-
ment.  
Bidney’s oeuvre had been silenced, with some exceptions such as 
the writings of Kroeber. In this paper, I review some of Bidney’s ideas 
and then consider American anthropological writings exemplifying 
the very fallacies he discusses and others that embrace some of 
Bidney’s far-seeing insights. But few examples exhibit the breadth and 
brilliance of Peirce’s vision, nor that of Lotman’s semiotics of culture 
and the work of his colleagues, as well as that of Roman Jakobson, all 
of which were not available to Bidney.   
 
 
1.2. Reflections on David Bidney’s insights  
into a semiotics of culture  
 
Bidney (1967: 37) held that he offered a “first statement, so far as I 
know, of the doctrine of emergent evolution, as applied to the history 
of human civilization”.  
As Bidney (1967: 40) reminds us, according to Aristotle, the scien-
ces were arranged in a hierarchical order according to their degree of 
abstraction, a view challenged by Descartes, Bacon, Voltaire, as well as 
Bidney, all of whom questioned the idea of continuity and plenitude. 
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Foreseeing, sharing and critiquing Darwinian thoughts, they believed 
that some species were now extinct and others were in the process of 
extinction. Referring to the ideas of critical rationalists, Bidney (1967: 
43) asserted that the Darwinian “sceptics indicated that there do seem 
to be leaps in nature and the assumption of a continuous scale of being 
is nothing but a product of ‘presumptuous imagination’”. 
As Bidney noted, John Locke “denied that man has any knowledge 
of ‘real essences’, and concluded that our conception of species are 
only ‘nominal essences’, which do not correspond to any fixed natural 
boundaries in natural species” (Bidney 1967: 44; quoting Locke 
1979[1824]). For Bidney, evolution is possible because there is con-
tinuity in the development of living beings, but also there is emergence 
of novelties or qualitative variation (Bidney 1967: 47). Aristotle’s prin-
ciple of “the hierarchical continuum” was combined with the evolu-
tionary principle of the transformation of species (Bidney 1967: 47). 
Bidney’s close collaborator, Alfred Kroeber, the leading anthro-
pologist following Boas, who established a second department of 
anthropology at the University of California, was indeed a historian 
who brought to the fore empirically established historical facts, but he 
upheld the complete separation of the organic and the superorganic. 
In 1945, this was partially rejected by Kroeber himself in his dynamic 
concept of change which liberated the diversity and freedom of the 
critical mind of the individual, which was the position of Boas. 
Referring to his friend Kroeber, Bidney wrote that although originally 
he “mistakenly saw strict separation of organic and social, I never-
theless called for the special qualities in the development cultural phe-
nomenon” (Bidney 1967: 37). Bidney quotes Kroeber: 
 
A new factor has arisen […] a factor that had passed beyond natural 
selection, that […] rocked and swayed by the oscillations of heredity 
that underlay it, nevertheless floated unimmersibly upon it […] The 
dawn of the social that is not a link in any chain, not a step in a path, but 
a leap to another plane. (Bidney 1967: 37)  
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Bidney writes that as far as he knows, these words are “the first state-
ment of the doctrine of emergent evolution as applied to the history of 
human civilization” (Bidney 1967: 37).  
Referring to the causes of culture, Bidney held that only individual 
societies are the efficient cause of cultural processes, which must not 
be confused with the formal and material conditions and cultural 
activities of persons in society (Bidney 1967: 33). Culture considered 
in its realistic and idealistic aspects requires a union of all forms of 
causality, rather than a focus on only unitary causal explanations such 
as the historical or Marxist ones, all of which ignore that man is a self-
determining agent (Bidney 1967: 33).  
Though not knowing Peirce, whose writings were hardly available, 
Bidney (Bidney 1967: 3) pointed out that “Man is a self-reflecting 
animal in that he alone has the ability to objectify himself, to stand 
apart from himself […] Man alone is capable of reflection, of self-
consciousness, of thinking of himselves as an object”. Humans are 
rational in the sense that they can conceive concepts or meanings as 
having universal significance. It is this ability to formulate concepts or 
symbols which renders man a symbolic animal and enables us to 
engage our logical, rational processes of thought. Non-human animals 
have the ability to perceive signs that have an immediate pragmatic 
value with reference to a given situation, but not referring to the past 
and the future. Nor can non-humans conceive of universal symbols or 
meanings and thereby create a language by which to communicate a 
cumulative result of their experience and reflections (Bidney 1967: 3). 
Thus, Peirce’s far-sighted concept of “man as a sign” was suggested by 
Bidney as well as the possibility of animals’ use of signs, which erodes 
the boundary between humans and non-humans, as well as the 
boundary between primitive man and man in civilization.  
Bidney reflected that language originated from the human desire to 
communicate experiences and thoughts to others and that human 
speech is both a cause and effect of social communication, but human 
communication is the primary function of language (Bidney 1967: 4), 
which suggests Bahtin’s dialogue and Jakobson’s belief that dialogue 
precedes monologue.  
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Bidney described the world of primitive man as an imaginary super 
sensuous world, a magic world of perpetual miracles where anything 
can happen and practically nothing is impossible. The primitive 
imagination is the source of poetry, religion, myth and art, and as 
Lévi-Strauss showed, also primitive science existed based on available 
context, and inventing bricolage. Later Eric Wolf revived the impor-
tance of imagination as the dominant source for ideology. “As a 
rational animal,” Bidney wrote, 
 
man is motivated by the quest for intelligibility, for meaning in his life 
and the world in which he exists. Because of his capacity for reflection 
and symbolic conceptualization man also seeks to understand the 
significance of his conduct, as well as his origins and destiny. Even 
primitive man […] speculating upon the origin of his society and 
culture and attempts to provide some answer to the great enigmas of 
birth and death (Bidney 1967: 5).  
  
Bidney concluded that “myth, religion, art, philosophy, and science are 
the historic expressions of man’s quest for an intelligible world, for a 
world of meaning and value” (Bidney 1967: 5). 
 
For Bidney, the dual nature of man is conveyed by his determinate 
psychobiological structure and function “and his indeterminate, 
historically acquired cultural personality [that] presupposes a certain 
measure of human freedom or self-determination” (Bidney 1967: 9). 
Such a position, taken by Bidney, was opposed to the deterministic, 
reification, or reductionist systems he viewed as fallacies. 
 
 
Part 2. Bidney’s fallacies: Examples 
 
The following remarks discuss Bidney’s fallacies, the use of which I 
believe has held back the development of American anthropology 
theory.    
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2.1. The positivist fallacy 
 
According to Bidney “The ultimate reality can be investigated by 
science but can never be completely known or verified as scientific 
theory and is subject to constant critical revisions” (Bidney 1967: 21). 
Practice refers to actual behavior, belief, and theory. Bidney holds that 
“the realists tend to confuse the actual aspects of culture with ideal 
culture by assuming that the covert or professed ideals are carried out 
in practice, whereas often this is not the case” (Bidney 1967: 32). This 
he calls the “positivistic fallacy” (ibid.). 
 
 
2.2. The normative fallacy 
 
According to Bidney (1967: 32), the normative idealists tend to define 
culture in terms of social ideals and tend to exclude the actual practice 
as not properly constitutive of culture, which may be called the 
“normativistic fallacy” or reification.  
Bidney warns that it is not sufficient simply to describe a culture’s 
practices, nor is it sufficient to assume that the ideals professed by the 
members of society are actually adhered to in practice. Every culture 
has its ideal and practical aspects and the social-scientist has to show 
the interrelation between the two areas.   
 
 
2.3. The metacultural fallacy 
 
Metaphysical fallacies of misplaced concreteness are the result of not 
viewing culture in both its theoretical and practical aspects. This 
would eliminate the necessity of trying to explain how it is possible for 
an abstract, logical structure to interact with an individual or society. 
(Bidney 1967: 32) Metacultural reality provides the pre-conditions for 
any cultural processes (Bidney 1967: 160). But Bidney agrees with 
Aristotle that the logic of power is not primary because creativity and 
imagination can transcend social environment. Therefore Bidney is 
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not a total relativist: rather he has a general theory of relativism 
integrating all cultural worlds (Bidney 1967: 179). 
Bidney comments that as a methodological device, it is frequently 
useful to abstract certain phenomena for systematic treatment while 
ignoring individuals and their motivations that were undoubtedly 
involved. It may be considered appropriate to act and think “as if” 
certain forms or patterns of phenomena do occur independently of the 
particular individuals and societies which initiated them. That was 
also Kroeber’s later method but is nevertheless simply a strategy.  
 
 
2.4. The fallacy of reduction to a single cause  
 
In a fundamental statement, Bidney states that only individuals and 
societies are the efficient cause of cultural processes, which must not 
be confused with formal or material or final causes and cultural 
activity of persons in society (Bidney 1967: 33). Culture requires a 
union of all forms of causality, as opposed to Marxist economic 
determinism, a fallacy which overlooks the function of man as a self-
determining agent (ibid.).  
Leslie White’s work exemplifies the “culturalistic fallacy” (or re-
ductionism or misplaced concreteness), which is committed when he 
mistakes an epistemic abstraction, such as the number of calories, for 
an ontological level of reality or autonomous order of nature (Bidney 
1967: 107).  
 
 
2.5. Nominalistic and formalist fallacies 
 
Summing up fallacies, Bidney looks to common elements and qualita-
tive novelty. To reduce all qualitative differences to a single kind of 
reality is also a fallacy of reductionism. The “nominalistic fallacy” is 
based on the principle of plentitude — the assumption that discrete 
entities are unrelated to one another. “The implication is that uni-
versals are but names, and thus there is no logical basis for relation 
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among things” (Bidney 1967: 44). The fallacy of formalism may also 
assume that forms of beings are unrelated to one another. 
 
 
2.6. The relativist fallacy 
 
The “relativist fallacy” as opposed to the meta-cultural concepts, ob-
scures any cultural processes (Bidney 1967: 188). If one is to agree with 
Aristotle and Einstein in postulating the fundamental creation of the 
human imagination, it would follow that man is inherently capable of 
transcending the limitation of his social cultural environment (Bidney 
1967: 179). The impossibilities of cultural relativism as applied to 
individual cultures are well argued by Bidney (1967: 181). What does a 
meta-investigation require? It would subsume the basic logical 
primitive assumptions of the perceived cultural reality, deep cultural 
norms of any given cultural system and the assumption that 
ontological factors shaping experience provide pre-cultural con-
ditioning for any cultural process whatsoever. Bidney rejects the anti-
thesis of absolute determinism versus freedom of thought. He holds 
that “to deny freedom of thought in the alleged interest of science is to 
undermine the very conditions of the scientific process” (Bidney 1967: 
179). The search for any cultural factors that universally unite humans 
points to one gap between the semiotic investigation as opposed to 
hypotheses and other studies which do not ask such questions, but in 
some cases may imply them.  
Partly after looking at these problems, I ask what kind of a basic 
significant unit in human culture shall we have? A cultural unity 
which impoverishes human life and thought by excluding whole areas 
of cultural experiences as meaningless may have the virtue of 
simplicity, but will fail nevertheless regardless of the learned support it 
may receive. Importantly, “cultural integration […] is not an un-
qualified good and […] everything depends on the nature of the final 
composition” (Bidney 1967: 182). For Bidney the problem of cultural 
integration is essentially the harmonizing of diverse polar interests and 
disciplines, each of which must enjoy a measure of autonomy to 
Facing emergences: Past traces and new directions in American anthropology  123
ensure its own creative advance. This principle of autonomy points to 
the limitations of logocentrism essentially critiqued by Lotman and 
Jakobson. 
The above summarizes some fallacies, pointed out by Bidney, that 
have been frequently been a part of anthropological writings. I turn 
now to examples of articles considering how they relate both nega-
tively and positively to the various principles Bidney described.  
 
 
Part 3. Ethnological Examples 
 
3.1. Bill Maurer: Introduction to ethnographic emergences 
 
The notable issue of the American Anthropologist (2005, 107/1) that I 
have referred to, entitled In Focus: Ethnographic Emergencies, is 
introduced by Maurer’s article Introduction to ‘Ethnographic Eme-
rgences’ (Maurer 2005). For Maurer, “world system theory, moderni-
zation theories, structural Marxism, and person-centered interpretive 
approaches offered analytical tools that did not readily fall into the 
traps of evolutionary or ecological determinism” (Maurer 2005: 1). 
The author states that “structuralism, hermeneutics, and structural 
Marxism offered an account of the meaningful words within which 
social action took place with a rigor lacking in U.S. anthropology” 
(ibid.). Asserting that anthropology has been going beyond the limits 
of narrow, traditional anthropology, and into other areas of know-
ledge for quite a while, however, this is now becoming an extremely 
conscious cry, apparently. The author seems to have agreed with 
Sherry Ortner’s remark that Bourdieu’s practice theory and related 
others obviated the “stale debates of materialist approaches, symbolic 
anthropology, and structuralism over causality, and even deeper (but 
rarely empirical observable) structures” (Maurer 2005: 1).   
For Maurer, open anthropology is an inter-relational field that 
bleeds across its frames. However, the frames need to be understood as 
metaphorical and porous. Maurer speaks of complex hybrids of nature 
and culture, for example, the ozone hole story, global warming, or 
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deforestation (Maurer 2005: 2). Is hybrid an appropriate term for the 
interrelation of nature and culture, or local and global, or particular 
and general, since “hybrid” is in fact the characteristics of all inter-
penetrating cultural customs and beliefs and biological interrelation-
ships? “Hybrids” are in fact essential for growth and change in culture.  
Maurer concludes his article with questionable comfort. He holds 
that the  
 
point of an emergence is that you do not know where it is going. The 
point of an anthropology of emergence is not to attempt to achieve the 
universal language adequate to all transformation, but to go along for 
the ride, in mutual, open-ended and yet limited entanglements which 
one might call friendship or perhaps ethnography (Maurer 2005: 4).  
 
But this statement trivializes serious theoretical findings and quests for 
universals, no matter how difficult the search.   
It appears to me that Maurer takes far too rigid an approach to 
various realms such as biology, socio-biology, natural history, ethics, 
ethnic sociology, and so forth. The issue of reality does not mean 
things escaping from their pre-made domains but searching for the 
complex realities of any particular phenomena which naturally be-
come penetrating areas that are not marked off by man-made domains 
or frames.  
Maurer’s answer to the myriad approaches of diversity in culture 
and nature as a capitulation to entanglement misses the point. Cer-
tainly Peirce’s abduction and hypothetical thinking, and Crapanzano’s 
imagination, and the Lotman school of interlocking texts and under-
lying rules and even explosion are not pure chaos but are challenges to 
further analysis and we are not going along blindly for the ride which 
trivializes the event.  
 
 
3.2. Cognitive anthropology 
 
Roy D’Andrade’s The Development of Cognitive Anthropology (1995) 
questions the so-called dichotomy between qualitative and quanti-
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tative, favoring the latter. In the forward, the author states that cogni-
tive anthropology is opposed to structuralist, interpretive, and post-
modern conceptions of culture. In this summing up, D’Andrade holds 
that cognitive anthropology is thirty-five years in the making, es-
tablishing that culture is knowledge, as was formulated by Ward 
Goodenough. The aim of cognitive anthropology is to determine the 
content and organization of such knowledge, and the underlying 
cultural categories through componential analysis of phonemics and 
phonetic systems and kinship terminologies. He notes nevertheless 
that Geertz (1973a: 12) disapproved of the formalizing and quanti-
tative aspects of this approach, referring to the cognitive fallacy as 
supposing that culture consists simply of mental phenomena.  
Going through the various moves in cognitive anthropology studies, 
D’Andrade tells us how features and taxonomic relations can be ap-
proached by means of semantic analysis of various domains such as kin, 
plants, colors, etc. By 1980, the dominant approach became schema 
theory in relation to networks concerning the nature of mental repre-
sentations. This was followed by a study of cultural models and meta-
phors. Cognitive anthropologists break culture into parts — and develop 
theories from the pieces of culture. D’Andrade (1995: 247) writes that: 
 
[I]f culture is placed in the mind, then the organization and limitations 
of the mind can be used to find cognitively formed units — features, 
prototypes, schemas, propositions, theories, etc. This makes possible a 
particulate theory of culture; that is a theory about the ‘pieces of culture’, 
their composition, and their relation to other things. One has to have a 
notion of separable units before the study of their distribution has any 
meaning.  
 
D’Andrade sees the current trend as the rejection of the concept of 
culture, and substitution of the term “discourse” when referring to 
symbols and meaning. Rejecting the notion of culture as a single 
structure “does not imply that there is no reason to investigate 
culture” (D’Andrade 1995: 251). We need to investigate how society 
works and the cognitive system — reasoning, memory, and perception. 
D’Andrade concludes that cognitive anthropology has been able to 
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provide reliable descriptions of cultural representations, and a bridge 
between culture and the functioning of the psyche.  
For cognitive anthropology, parts precede the whole, knowledge is 
privileged and psychological traits serve the needs of the culture 
carrier in mapping out his or her life. Neglected is the relation to the 
aesthetic, emotional syndromes, imagination, and creativity and con-
text. Thus the behaviorist heritage still lurks — what you see, feel, 
smell, and what computational machines can evaluate as valid aspects 
of the culture’s map, are the empirical realities. Different problems not 
answered by a quantitative approach come to be dropped out — 
problems such as Kluckhorn’s values, Kardiner’s personality and 
culture, Benedict’s Patterns of Culture, Crapanzano’s imagination, and 
others. What is left out appears to me to be more essential than what is 
included. A major problem is the method: description, quantification, 
particularization, ruling out all that may not fall within this rubric, 
overlooking the integration and interlocking of aspects of the mind 
and culture which must precede any attempt to divide up culture, 
which indeed is not stable since interrelations are vulnerable to many 
aspects of chance, history, and context. 
 
 
3.3. Elizabeth Brumfiel:  
Cloth, gender and continuity and change 
 
In Elizabeth Brumfiel’s article Cloth, gender and continuity and change 
(Brumfiel 2006), she compares backstrap dash loom weaving in three 
cultural contexts and historical dimensions — ancient Mayan, ancient 
Aztec, and 20th century Meso-Americans. Within each group, weaving 
had a different meaning and function. For example, among the Maya, 
weaving defined class; among the Aztecs, weaving defined gender and 
among 20th century Meso-Americans, weaving defined ethnicity. 
There is considerable discussion in this article about the back-
ground of these functions, and the changes and meanings of the 
various forms of weaving. The author wishes to find some of the 
underlying paradigmatic properties of these three elements. She 
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criticizes Saussurean linguistics for requiring understanding of a thing 
by understanding what it is not. This study is primarily a historical 
and descriptive narrative of three groups of peoples. It does not 
advance much beyond the referential meanings, and the deeper levels 
of the aesthetic, the metaphorical, and the poetic are barely implied, 
but it does at least restore the historical method and the issue of 
multifunctionality and cultural meanings. 
 
 
3.4. Russell Leigh Sharman: Re/ Making La Negrita: Culture as an 
Aesthetic System in Costa Rica and Turner’s Remarks 
 
The main concern of the next article Re/ Making La Negrita: Culture 
as an aesthetic system in Costa Rica (Sharman 2006) is the question of 
how meaning is produced in the veneration of La Negrita, the Black 
Madonna and also the patron of Costa Rica. Both appear as an appa-
rition and an icon. The article argues that meaning is produced and 
reproduced through the “attachment of value to […] the experience of 
worshipping a tiny stone carving of the Madonna and child” (Sharman 
2006: 842). According to the author, meaning is rarely shared as it is 
constrained by social relationships of power. Meaning is considered as 
produced, reframing culture as an aesthetic system, and is understood 
as the “primary processes of valuation” (Sharman 2006: 843) as they 
relate to experience and the re-creation of experience through cultural 
production. 
The author holds that “crucial to this argument is the distinction 
between the perception of value and the production of meaning as two 
parts of an aesthetic system” (Sharman 2006: 843) and that “what 
becomes recreated as socially valued experience in this aesthetic 
system […] is rooted in relations of power that are hegemonic in the 
Gramscian sense” (ibid.). However, according to Turner “agency is not 
delegated to intellectuals as it is in Gramsci’s formulation, it is 
inherent in the democratic quality of ‘an experience’, which is able to 
‘repudiate all pasts’” (Turner 1986 in Sharman 2006: 843). There is a 
dialectic tension between the immediacy of experience and the media-
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tion of power that forces constant revising (Turner 1986: 36 in Shar-
man 2006: 843).  
As an object of religious worship, La Negrita is both “Other and 
intimate, producing a phenomenological bracketed experience — a 
salient moment of religious awe” (Sharman 2006: 844). The article 
traces the dynamic history of the La Negrita from an indigenous ritual 
to an instrument of power utilized by the Spanish in nationalist move-
ments. According to the author, “the cult of the La Negrita began as an 
invention of the church and the colonial state to recognize the growing 
mulatta population around Cartago” (Sharman 2006: 845). “La Neg-
rita became a black symbol used to further segregate the colonial 
population” (ibid.). The complex history continues but the argument 
ends with the following conclusion. “La Negrita exists at the nexus of 
an aesthetic system where the egalitarianism of experience is always in 
conflict with the authoritarian meaning […] Together, they offer a 
more nuanced understanding of culture as an aesthetic system, and 
what happens in the space between a significant event and an event of 
significance” (Sharman 2006: 851).  
The author explains culture as an aesthetic system in only a general 
way. Jakobson was a pioneer in the importance of aesthetics but also of 
context, multifunctionalism, and multisemiotics, as well as Arnheim 
and others. However, Sharman’s treatment does not concern indivi-
dual behavior but rather is a history with the exception of a short myth. 
Dialogue is also not a part of Sharman’s depiction — for that we have 
to look to Bahtin, and others of the present group in Tartu. It is also 
unclear why value and meaning need to be considered as two separate 
parts of an aesthetic system.  
 
 
3.5. Anthropology: A diplomatic middle way 
 
Bruce Knauft (2006) considers anthropology in the middle. He be-
lieves that negative paradigms need not exist in cultural anthropology. 
He opposes master theory’s reliance on master narratives and history, 
giving preferred American anthropological examples. Rather, this 
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“part” approach is exemplified by mosaics of part theoretical asser-
tions, part historical events, and part activist voices, and does not rely 
on general theories and paradigms or suggestions about creative and 
critical combinations. Knauft argues that anthropology is post-para-
digmatic. The concept of culture has defuse meanings and therefore 
the term structure should be cast in the adjectival form, structural. 
Practice and agency all could be adjectival, as could modernity. Theory 
is also reduced to theoretical. 
Knauft notes that according to Catherine Lutz (The gender of 
theory, 1995), master narratives were associated with men while an 
example of the middle ground, of which she approves, is the work of 
Hertzfeld, who is a man (Knauft 2006: 413). Repeated terms are 
middle, mid-level, middle ground, mid-range, and intermediate. This 
article strains to be mainstream. It expresses fear of theory but does 
not wish to be considered anti-theoretical. It generally rejects history. 
It appears that clear, accurate, and mindless competition is the model 
(autism). One must be careful not to tread on non-controversial views, 
except corpuses of contemporary work. Surely Peirce’s fallibilism is far 
preferable to perfect middle cores. And here there is an example of the 
sanitizing of a rich field, losing the breadth of human culture. Indeed, 
in Knauft’s writings, culture is no longer a noun, but a mild adjective. 
Since semiotic studies are inventing theoretical interpretations in the 
context of history, Knauft’s careful method is far afield.  
 
 
3.6. Dialogic anthropology and history 
 
The Dialogic Emergence of Culture (ed. Dennis Tedlock and Bruce 
Manheim, University of Illinois, 1995) is a collection of essays based 
on Jakobson’s and Bahtin’s view that dialogue is a more fundamental 
form of speech than monologue. Language as a shared system is an 
emergent property of dialogue. “Once culture is seen as arising from a 
dialogical background, then language itself is renewable as an emer-
gent cultural (or intercultural) phenomenon, produced, reproduced, 
and revised between field workers and natives. The dialogical ap-
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proach amounts to a critique of expectation and of interpretive 
anthropology where the literal conversations are submerged between 
interpretants and already produced texts” (Tedlock, Manheim 1995: 2). 
Jakobson argued that there is no such thing as individual speech 
without dialogue. Even inner speech “is only an elliptic and allusive 
substitute for the more explicit enunciated speech. Furthermore, 
dialogue underlies even inner speech” (Jakobson quoted in Tedlock, 
Manheim 1995: 7). Thus language as a shared system becomes an 
emergent property of dialogues rather than being granted ontological 
priority over speech (Tedlock, Manheim 1995:1). “Cultures are pro-
duced […] in dialogues […] shared culture emerges from interaction” 
(Tedlock, Manheim 1995: 2).  
The dialogical turn was opposed to the separation of culture from 
language, but that separation, which began in 1940, only grew worse. 
In the post WWII period, the authors hold that “language came to be 
regarded as a secondary representation of independently figured social 
and cultural forms” (Tedlock, Manheim 1995: 6). White and Bahtin’s 
observation that all discourse is “replete with echoes, allusions, 
paraphrasing, and outright quotations of prior discourse” (Tedlock, 
Manheim 1995: 7) has proved to be far more fruitful.  
The introduction to Dialogic Emergence of Culture is followed by a 
collection of essays employing a dialogic model and concludes with a 
question and answer chapter considering interpretative culture while 
the notion of “text” is used in various treatments. Notably, the inter-
pretative method of these studies does not employ the Tartu school’s 
“text”1 to any degree in its systematic method that raises questions of 
                                                 
1   Juri Lotman and his followers paved the road for new paths in contemporary 
semiotics, labelling their approach “semiotics of culture”. A focal concept was the 
text and I pause here to introduce the background to this term. In 1962, 
Pjatigorskij defined the text as a variety of signals composing a delimited, 
autonomous whole. In the spatial sphere it must be fixed, in the pragmatic sphere 
the text has an inner structure, in the semantic sphere it must be understandable 
(Pjatigorskij 1971[1962]: 76). In 1970 Lotman described a culture as a “semiotic 
mechanism for the output and storage of information” (Lotman 1970: 2), and “a 
historical evolved bundle of semiotic systems (languages) which can be composed 
Facing emergences: Past traces and new directions in American anthropology  131
many forms of signs, universals and underlying values, as does 
Lotman. Lotman began to perceive cultural behavior as text, not just 
linguistic behavior. “Text” includes the non-verbal sphere as well as 
language as quoted in Portis-Winner and Winner (1976), and it 
became a fundamental significant unit of cultural semiotic systems. 
Lotman agreed with Jakobson’s position on the priority of dialogue 
which generates language on which the idea of semiosphere is based. 
“The ensemble of semiotic formations […] as single, isolated language, 
is a precondition for its existence” (Lotman 1984: 16). “Dialogues […] 
become one of the ontological characteristics of the semiosphere”. “All 
borders”, writes Lotman, are bilingual”. Thus, concludes Lotman, “the 
elementary act of thinking is translation, and the elementary mecha-
nism of translation is dialogical” (Lotman 1992: 143).   
As far as it goes, Tedlock’s and Manheim’s collection uses a Bah-
tinian dialogic semiotic approach. It is a study of verbal behavior and 
does not consider all possible signs as does Peirce, nor the fact that 
there exist non-verbal areas of culture, and that sign-like systems exist 
among non-humans. Nevertheless this study carries us forward.   
 
 
3.7. Sherry Ortner: Theory in anthropology since the sixties, 
comments about power by Eric Wolf 
 
In general, the important issue of power in meaning and human rela-
tions is not sufficiently studied or taken account of. Lukes sees three 
dimensions of power (Lukes 1974 as summarized in Heyman 2003: 
142): in the first one, one party gains the power in open confrontation; 
in the second dimension, the confrontation is not open, but the 
opinions of the two parties are conflicting; and in the third dimension 
                                                                                                    
into a single hierarchy (superlanguage) which also can be a semiosis of 
independent systems” (Lotman 1970: 8). As Lotman wrote, a semiotically evolved 
bundle of semiotic systems can be composed into a single hierarchy. Later he 
preferred the term “text” and introduced the concept of semiosphere, the widest 
area in which sign systems could be extended and could bring about a link to 
another plane, and semiosphere was followed by the biosphere.    
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of power, the governing party shapes the cultural and social frame-
work so that the subordinates show positive support to the super-
ordinates, in spite of their own aims. This last aspect needs to become 
more transparent for anthropology that studies the semiotics of 
meaning. As an example, Lukes analyzes various attempts to exemplify 
power, and particularly the devil and commodity fetish (a ritual) in 
South America (described in Taussig 1980). I have described Wolf’s 
concept of imagination in the minds of subordinate power-holders 
(Portis-Winner 2006). In his Envisioning Power, Eric Wolf held that 
power “is an aspect of all relations of people.” He argues that structural 
power makes some kind of behavior possible, while making others less 
possible (Wolf 1999: 385). Structural power steps outside the structure 
(Wolf 1999: 62). It is best seen in a historical, comparative method.  
As I have written (Portis-Winner 2006), Eric Wolf calls for some 
interrelations between the fields of anthropology as early as his 1964 
book, Anthropology (Wolf 1964), and repeated in 1974 with some sad 
reflection, writing that the state of affairs continues. Sherry Ortner 
writes in her article Theory in anthropology since the sixties (Ortner 
1984) that she agrees with Wolf’s position, and even refers to the past 
metaphor of the anthropologist Lowie, who described culture as 
“shreds and patches” (Ortner 1984: 126) Ortner believes that while 
anthropology was never united, it has devised some large categories of 
theoretical applications, arguments, and issues which she does not see 
as yet substantiated. This problem points to a fundamental gap 
between contemporary anthropology and the broad goals of the 
Lotman group. Eric Wolf (1964: 96) writes in his analysis of power, 
that “the anthropological point of vantage is that of a world struggling 
to be born”. What is worth studying is human experience in all its 
variability and complexity. His aim was to set the framework bridging 
the humanities with anthropology. In his last book, he commented 
that such a synthesis had not occurred; rather there were growing 
schisms in the field (Wolf 2001: 11). In his preface to Envisioning 
Power (Wolf 1999), he held that human sciences were unwilling or 
unable to come to grips with how cultural configurations intertwine 
with considerations of power. He wrote that his aim was the 
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exploration of ideas and power observed in streams of behavior and 
recorded texts. In this pursuit he also wrote in a private commu-
nication that he wished to explore Peirce’s third — unfortunately he 
did not live to carry out this task. He also brought to the fore the oft-
neglected role of the imagination (Wolf 1999) as the formation of 
ideology in his discussion of the Kwakuitl, the Aztecs, and the Ger-
mans through the Nazi period.  
Similar to Wolf, Ortner refers to an “apathy of spirit” since Boas 
(Ortner 1984: 127). The Boas school began as a revolt against past 
misunderstandings and issues concerning race and culture and 
mythological evolution. But on this basis, he called for a new spirit, 
where race, language, and culture should be reconceptualized, and 
where the art of indigenous Indian groups should be understood in 
their own right, styles, meanings. His approach was a combination of 
humanism and science. Ortner proposes to rescue anthropology from 
a post-Boas decline by introducing new key terms: symbol, action, or 
praxis. She states that three movements emerged in the sixties: 
symbolic anthropology, cultural ecology, and structuralism. She holds 
that Geertz and Turner were the leaders of symbolic anthropology. 
Ortner points out that Geertz’s anti-theoretical bias and his limiting of 
the symbol primarily to its referential meaning (which I believe is not 
quite accurate) are opposed to Turner’s position. However, Turner’s 
symbols have many levels and meanings, including roles, religion, and 
beliefs, and Turner conceives of symbols as more dynamic than does 
Geertz (Ortner 1984: 129–131). In this sense Turner is closer to a 
semiotic approach. According to Ortner, Geertz did not analyze types 
of symbols and was not interested in ethos or culture embodied in 
public symbols, although he attempted to study culture from the 
native’s point of view, but at times he confused his impressions with 
the values of the Balinese described. Geertz’s approach was limited 
since it was not based on theory and action. I believe that his call for 
the native point of view, whether fully successful (which it was not), 
was his fundamental contribution to a more sophisticated awareness 
of internal or ethos meaning in culture and contributed to the semiotic 
effort to explore multiple points of view depending on the context of 
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the individual being studied. Margaret Mead had already contributed 
that anthropologists cannot avoid seeing a culture through their own 
cultural lens, thus she believed that the observers should try to account 
for this in their writings.   
Ortner points out that Turner did not see society as harmonious 
integration based on symbols. Rather he saw actors as moving from 
one status to another, which she held was an active forerunner con-
cerned with pragmatics. But she noted that both Geertz and Turner 
lacked sound theoretical systems (Ortner 1984: 131–132). 
Other movements discussed by Ortner are evolutionary anthro-
pology, ecological and adaption anthropology; she did not note that all 
of these are useful when not hampered by oversimplications and 
reductionism. According to Ortner, structuralism was invented by 
Lévi-Strauss (Ortner 1984: 135), which of course is not true. Structu-
ralism was developed by Jakobson, Mukařovský and others in Prague, 
and was outlined in their notable thesis, “The Prague Linguistic 
Circle”, and has unfortunately been confused with Russian formalism. 
Structuralism of the Prague innovation was a rebellion against Saus-
sure’s static linguistics and structuralism, since the Saussurean structu-
ralism was not dynamic.  
Ortner (1984: 141–144) also highlights political economy which 
she says sided with capitalism, with some exception as for example the 
work of Edward Said. Ortner believes, in agreement with Wolf’s view 
but not his spirit, that by the eighties anthropology was disintegrating. 
But Marxist and political economists continued to dominate anthro-
pology. She was apparently thinking of economic anthropology in this 
generalization.  
As opposed to the disorganized state of anthropology, Ortner 
concludes by pushing a modern practice theory. The system of prac-
tice theory is explained as a seamless whole. According to Ortner 
(1984: 149), practice is the study of all forms of human action from a 
political angle. 
Practice, then, is the key symbol of anthropology of the eighties. In 
spite of Ortner’s long discussion of anthropological concepts and 
practices, there is no mention of what I have called the gap. Thus while 
Facing emergences: Past traces and new directions in American anthropology  135
serious biological and physical scientists (and Lotman’s semiotics of 
culture) were grappling with larger and unifying themes — dynamics 
of change and communication understood as applying both to the 
non-human and human world — anthropology for Ortner remains a 
particular form of praxis. This is not to say that Ortner has not com-
mented on some important directions — e.g., by Vincent Crapanzano, 
Del Hymes, Victor Turner, and others. But her anthropology “since 
the eighties” leans towards a narrow path. We need a broader and 
more humanistic and scientific frame, which I shall try to point to as 
this essay continues. Thus Ortner’s disappointing suggestions about 
the state of affairs from the sixties on are too limited to guide us to 
adventure into the broadest goals. 
 
 
Part 4. Recent approaches in interpretation of signs 
 
4.1. Geertz and relativism 
 
Geertz’s article Distinguished lecture: Anti anti-relativism (1984) is a 
defence of his brand of relativism. Here Geertz denies nihilistic 
implications, without making the argument for the denial. It seems 
that for Geertz relativism means a benign tolerance but its limits are 
not drawn in any clear way (1984). In Geertz’s Thick Description 
(1973a: 5) his positions are well summed up:  
 
The concept of culture I espouse […] is essentially a semiotic one. 
Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of 
significance he himself has spun. I take culture to be those webs and the 
analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law 
but an interpretive one in search of meaning.  
 
Here the rejection of laws for interpretation both approach and 
distance Geertz’s oevre from Lotman’s semiotics of culture. Geertz 
concludes his 1995 study with yet another metaphor, this one 
borrowed from Bruner’s Acts of Meaning (1990: 150), a comment on 
the most famous Sanskrit drama, Kalidasa’s Sakuntala, where the sage 
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does not recognize the elephant, only its footprint after the elephant 
has left, from which he concludes that an elephant had been present 
(Geertz 1995:167). Geertz remarks that “ethnographic anthropology is 
like that; trying to reconstruct elusive, rather ethereal and by now 
wholly departed elephants from the footprints they have left on my 
mind” (Geertz 1995:167).   
Geertz sees this as a critique of post-positivism (Geertz 1995: 167–
8). This metaphor brings to mind Peirce’s example of an index (the 
footprint), but for Peirce the index is not isolated. It means binarism 
whether the index is contiguous with its object or operates on the 
principle of pars pro totum. The index for Peirce does not refer to 
something wholly departed and indeed if the sign is fulfilled it leads us 
to thirdness and the symbolic level. In a sense Geertz gives up the 
battle by assigning ethnography to individual fictions, and facts to 
mere traces.  
While Geertz reminds us (1973b: 448–9) that various notions of 
“text” since the Middle Ages have freed the term from the confines of 
scripture and writing, allowing us to see all culture as an “assemblage 
of texts”. Geertz’s idea of “text” remains additive and theoretically 
underdeveloped, and thus “the more profound corollary, as far as 
anthropology is concerned, that cultural forms can be treated as texts, 
as imaginative works built out of social materials, has yet to be 
systematically exploited” (Geertz 1973b: 449). However, the concept of 
“text” was at the time being thoroughly discussed by the Moscow-
Tartu group.  
For Geertz, the purpose of interpretation of culture, or penetration 
of a text, is limited to discovering its social semantics, and Geertz is 
not concerned with underlying theoretical organizing principles such 
as values, norms, world views, or structures, and in fact he dismisses 
the whole area of syntactics as a subject of investigation. Accordingly, 
in his Thick Description (Geertz 1973a: 10) Geertz maintains that, 
“Once human behavior is seen as symbolic action […] the question as 
to whether culture is patterned conduct […] loses sense”. 
In Geertz’s later work, After the Fact: Two Countries, Four Decades, 
One Anthropologist (1995), anti-system and relativistic persuasion 
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predominate, as do cultural performances seen as narration of stories, 
which was his concluding affirmation in his notable Notes on a 
Balinese cockfight (Geertz 1973b). As Geertz puts it in his After the 
Fact, “One is faced […] with a confusion of histories […] There is no 
general story to be told” (Geertz 1995: 2). More specifically, he states 
that “Floundering through mere happenings and then concocting 
accounts of how they hang together is what knowledge and illusion 
consist in” (Geertz 1973a: 3). In his Imaginative Horizons, Crapanzano 
(2004: 87) decries the resulting emptiness of Geertz’s “floundering”, 
and comments that “Ironically […] the denial of the possibility of a 
‘real’ mimetic account, of any master narrative […] does in fact 
announce an overarching master narrative — a consuming obsession 
with artifice”.   
 
 
4.2. Turner and performance anthropology 
 
A key issue in Turner’s anthropology of performance is his intense 
interest in the inner life of the subjects he studied. He stresses the 
symbolism not only of objects but also of social dramas the roots of 
which he sees in Greek drama (Turner 1982: 11–12). Turner extends 
Van Gennep’s concept of the liminal to his own liminoid, which refers 
to the carnival atmosphere in complex societies. Here he is clearly 
influenced by phenomenology and by Dilthey and prefers the idea of a 
hermeneutic spiral to that of the circle. His use of montage suggests 
Jakobson’s metonymic metaphor and Turner’s social drama, which 
was of formative importance based on process and dynamics, and 
suggests Crapanzano’s scene, which I discuss next, as well as Bahtin’s 
study of medieval carnival. Turner’s complex use of symbols in his 
study of the Ndembu and other works fundamentally influenced the 
anthropology of meaning where symbols are immersed in rich rituals 
and traditional context and beliefs, conscious or subliminal. Turner 
does not use the concept of “text”, nor does he suggest a system 
beyond interpretation.  
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4.3. Syncretism and the role of imagination 
 
I turn now to Vincent Crapanzano’s Imaginative Horizons: An Essay 
in Literary-Philosophical Anthropology (Crapanzano 2004), which 
echoes Wolf’s plea (1999) for attention to that almost limitless factor, 
imagination. The book opens with a quote from Joseph-Marie de 
Gérando. Gerando wrote that “The imagination is the first faculty that 
one must study in the savage because it is the one that nourishes all the 
others”; it is the “first faculty to develop in the individual” (cited from 
Crapanzano 2004: 7). The collected lectures are devoted to cultural 
creativity and the particular tensions that are involved in cultural 
creativity which according to Crapanzano American anthropologists 
have avoided (with the possible exception of Kroeber). Rather they 
have spoken in an often “deterministic fashion, of invention, adap-
tation, syncretism, cultural change, development, and evolution” (Cra-
panzano 2004: 1). Crapanzano holds that American anthropologists 
are “more concerned with the products of imagination than with the 
process of imagination, and that the individual has been slighted” 
(Crapanzano 2004: 1). He employs Bonnefoy’s image of the “arrière-
pays” (Bonnefoy 1982; in Crapanzano 2004: 2) the hinterland, as a 
kind of governing trope. Crapanzano looks at openness and closedness 
and how we construct horizons that determine what we experience 
and interpret.  
Crapanzano’s interest is in fuzzy horizons, “auras” that “always 
accompany experience and resist full articulation” (Crapanzano 1992a: 
2). Once the horizons are articulated they freeze our view of reality 
“fatally”, were it not that a “new horizon emerges and with it a new 
beyond” (ibid.), followed by a new horizon, suggesting the aftermath, 
the less violent version of Lotman’s explosion. The dialectic of 
openness and closure haunts Crapanzano. In the book just quoted and 
an earlier one, Tuhami (Crapanzano 1980), he feels that the attempt is 
to unmask the ways that ethnographic writings leave their imprint on 
supposedly objective data, and he considers how power and desire 
affect ethnographic writings. His books (Crapanzano 1992a; 2004) 
“play with form and subject […] and create […] disquiet […] and a 
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kind of turbulence in the reader” (Crapanzano 2004: 3). In Imagina-
tive Horizons montage juxtaposes the unexpected ethnographic 
description with romantic poems (ibid.). The aim is “to destroy preju-
dices, [to] open horizons, and promote creative thought and action” 
(Crapanzano 2004: 3). Thus the penchant of humans “to reduce the 
strange to the familiar, the exotic to the banal, or in extremis to 
eliminate the strange, the exotic and the foreign by violent means” is 
critiqued (ibid.). He holds that “the reductions are all too often 
facilitated by academic disciplines that do so uncritically in the name 
of one science or another” (ibid.).   
Crapanzano does not oppose scientific approaches to anthropology 
as long as they meet appropriate epistemological and methodological 
standards and acknowledge moral and political implications. But he 
critiques anthropological approaches and other humane sciences that 
model themselves on some other science, the subject of which is 
radically different from that of anthropology. Additionally, narrow 
anthropologies leave out what may be the most vital. He holds that 
anthropology has a moral charge: if we dismiss everything a people 
holds important and reduce their culture to ecology and adaption, or 
cognitive or genetic or evolutionary schemes, and we promote our 
own parochialism, we devalue those we study. Also important is what 
these people say about us. He accuses Americans of complacency 
arising out of “studied ignorance or indifference” and argues that 
“anthropology should always be pluralized” because it is essentially 
“an interstitial discipline” (Crapanzano 2004: 5). 
Crapanzano believes his montage design rescues the importance of 
the individual perspective, for a focus on the general has resulted in 
distortion, simplification, and determinisim, and has led to the 
ignoring of imaginative play, creativity, transgressive possibility, and 
human freedom. He mistrusts both sociological and psychological 
explanations, considering them as just-so stories or ideologies that 
offer comfort when we are faced with the confusing, the puzzling, and 
the “seemingly unknowable” (Crapanzano 2004: 6). He prefers the 
puzzlement of the montage to easy explanations, process over topo-
graphy, the temporal over the spatial.  
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Each chapter is introduced by a quotation that presents a theme of 
imagination (body, pain, hope, memory, trauma, transgression, or 
death). Such underlying discontinuity and disjunction cast in a poetic 
dimension is often ignored in ethnography. We do our best to deny 
the high stakes in interpretation, he writes. For example, there is the 
US-Iraq war, where one response to the challenge is the obliteration of 
those who pose the challenge. “Despite the […] reality of terrorism, 
weapons of mass destruction, oil interests, and paranoid personalities, 
the projected war is also a Kulturkrieg” (Crapanzano 2004: 11).  
For Crapanzano, the objective is enveloped in the subjective under-
standing. He calls for “self-critical reading understood both literally 
and metaphorically that resists full closure” (Crapanzano 2004: 11). It 
is the frontiers as horizons extending into the space-time of the imagi-
nary that fascinates us. Thus he sees imagination through a trope — 
the arrière-pays, the au-delà, and ailleurs — recalling Yves Bonnefoy. 
Crapanzano translates arrière-pays as hinterland, meaning back-
ground, a land or places that are simpler, that are beyond where one is 
but that are intimately related to where one is. The beyond is like 
shadows; the beyond slips away only to reappear just when we thought 
we had rid ourselves of it — reminding us of the literature of Proust, 
Peirce’s infinite regression2, and the novel Snow by Orhan Pamuk.   
Crapanzano takes us into imaginative vistas never ending. He adds, 
in his poetic view, whole dimensions more to culture than others have 
grappled with, but compares with Eric Wolf’s imaginative ideologies, 
and Orhan Pamuk’s imagination of other worlds. 
Like Peirce, Crapanzano holds that although dialectical models of 
self-constitution conceptualize the process in dyadic terms as between 
self and other, such models must be understood “in triadic terms”. He 
                                                 
2   Peirce defined the sign as something which stands to somebody for something 
else. The sign was composed of a first, iconic (similarity, artistic), a second, index 
(contiguity, struggle), and a third, symbolic, in which the relation to the object is 
conventional. All three levels compose the symbolic sign, which was hardly 
limited to its referential meaning. Peirce’s third, or context, was ever present and 
was of the order of rules, norms, traditions, ways of perceiving time and space, 
basic values, and as such, poses some similarities to Crapanzano’s “background”. 
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states that the Western characterization of the self reflects our strong 
emphasis on the referential role of language at the expense of the 
pragmatic (Crapanzano 1992b: 94–95), and notably, at the expense of 
the aesthetic and the metalevel of analysis. Crapanzano finds that 
ascriptions of the self and other can be metapragmatic ascriptions that 
describe pragmatic features and are expressed metaphorically. The 
term meta-pragmatic and the problem of higher semantic authority in 
a dialogue were Bahtin’s innovations and were then taken up by 
Crapanzano. 
Like Bahtin, for Crapanzano, all ascriptions of self and other have a 
commenting and double role. Frequently, in dual, multi-ethnic cultu-
res there are strange juxtapositions where the trope to be read suggests 
Bahtin’s dialogue, Lotman’s montage and Jakobson’s montage and 
metonymic metaphors. It also echoes Peirce’s auto-communication, 
exemplified by his story of the child who unwittingly touches a hot 
stove and learns that non-ego is signaling to ego — and is the sign of 
consciousness of self as other, in other words auto-communication.   
In his afterword to Manganaro’s volume, Crapanzano holds that 
“the post-modernist proclamation that master narratives are dead 
[…]” puts “into question the taking of (and justifying of the taking of) 
an extra-textual stance of accepting the narrative” (Crapanzano 1990: 
303).    
For Crapanzano a focal issue today is the fate of the authoritative 
function which he calls the Third. Crapanzano sees this function as a 
guarantee of meaning mediating any interlocution and as technically 
being a metapragmatic function and clearly not mere fiction.   
 
The Third may be symbolized […] by such notions as the law, 
conventions, reason, cultural tradition, language, [etc]. It may be 
embodied by father, king or priest […] by spirits, deities and even by a 
third person (the audience) in any dyadic exchange […] When the 
Third is simply an empty function, there can be no communication 
(Crapanzano 1992b: 90).  
 
Here Crapanzano invokes Peirce’s mediating Third, the symbol which 
is never empty but is based on reflection and relationships and also 
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invokes Bahtin’s “double-voiced words”, where the speaker inserts a 
new semantic orientation which already has — and retains — its own 
orientation (Bahtin 1981: 156 in Crapanzano 1992b: 93). Crapanzano 
notes that where the commitment to the egalitarian pretense is very 
strong, it well may be that no participant to the exchange may willing-
ly admit that his recontextualizing response to the other has higher 
semantic authority. It is this meta-parodic situation that resembles the 
discourse of the post-modernist’s postulates (Crapanzano 1992b: 94). 
Such parodic situations are pertinent also to present-day politics. For 
example, under communist regimes, in Poland, there was an active 
dissident industry studying “double speak” — the unmasking of the 
double meaning and egalitarian pretense conveyed by official state-
ments. Indeed, notes Crapanzano, traditional empirical approaches 
have ignored the mutual change that occurs in a dialogue (Crapan-
zano 1992b: 98).  
Crapanzano asks what is happening today to memory, and by 
extension to history; and does not this vacuum lead to the defense-
lessness and even attraction to fundamentalism (Crapanzano 1992a: 
99)? He leaves us with the question whether we can recapture the 
Third and, drawing on Benjamin, Crapanzano asks if one erases but 
does not expunge, would this erased miracle be the return of the Third, 
our western hegemony — and the capacity to escape meta-parodic 
indeterminacy by knowing whose parody is empowered (ibid.)? 
 
 
Crapanzano’s The scene 
 
Crapanzano writes that he explores the relationship between objective 
paramount reality and its subjective, shadowy world, “edging on the 
imaginative, which I call the scene”, suggesting the two interplaying 
realities and “our present take on the ‘empirical’ has led us to ignore 
this dimension of experience” (Crapanzano 2006: 387). He calls 
attention to the “intersubjective nature of subjectivity itself and offer a 
preliminary attempt at understanding the complex interlocutory-the 
indexical-dramas occurring in ritual, for example, psychoanalysis and 
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anthropological research, that constitute the scene” (Crapanzano 2006: 
387).   
He finds that we ignore or reject the romantic or “the ‘subjecti-
fication’ of the putatively objective contexts […] of the phenomena we 
observe” (Crapanzano 2006: 388). He differentiates between objective 
reality and what he calls the “scene”. Crapanzano argues that “subjec-
tivity […] is essentially intersubjective”, mediated through language 
and immediately through encounters (Crapanzano 2006: 389). The 
scene colors and intones the objective. It is the objective reality that 
gives us epistemic if not ontological security. We could speak of the 
scene, says Crapanzano, by analogy with double-voicing, as double 
sighted, like suggested by Bahtin’s world. How the scene is framed by 
the situation in which one finds oneself affects how one responds to it 
or even ignores it (Crapanzano 2006: 389).  
Crapanzano (2006: 392) describes a communion service in an 
evangelical church, a ritual that he compares to Turner’s (1974: 94) 
communitas, or Durkheim’s social effervescences at the core of primi-
tive rituals. Crapanzano suggests such rituals express loneliness (as 
opposed to communitas). Ritual studies may be felt as miraculous, 
mystery, and the uncanny having no real referent. Crapanzano, being 
a rationalist, needs to account for the miraculous. He stresses that “the 
paradoxical relationships between contingency and repetition — a 
repetition that both enhances the contingent as it disarms it” (Crapan-
zano 2006: 394). He argues that one finds oneself in the synchronic 
present and the diachronic past “that affords interlocutory possibility” 
(Crapanzano 2006: 395). Here I see reverberations with Jakobson’s 
metonymic metaphors (continuity, metonymy, and repetition) while 
metaphor is the rejection of the dichotomies of synchrony and 
diachrony in favor of similarity (Jakobson 1960).  
Crapanzano asks why we cling to empirical reality, “why has that 
reality become the bulwark of an epistemological discipline that, 
despite its rejection of any ethical foundation, is carried out with such 
moral rigor” (Crapanzano 2004: 398)? He explains that he is not 
making a plea for the irrational but rather “for an opening of our 
empiricism to include within its purview the irrational — the less than 
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rational” (Crapanzano 2004: 396). Crapanzano explains how do 
“interlocutory exchanges precipitate the scene, if not paramount 
reality […] the relation between scene and reality”. (Crapanzano 2004: 
398) In many cultures memory and reality are conceptually confused 
but latent interlocutors are never wholly absent (Crapanzano 2004: 
399).  “There are times when the indexing of the scene may so mask 
the indexing of paramount reality that reality slips away” (ibid.).   
In Crapanzano’s words, “We should discuss the social construction 
of the way scenes and realities are related or not related to one 
another” (Crapanzano 2004: 398). We need to consider the way “in 
which interlocutory exchanges precipitate the scene and […] the 
relationship between the scene and reality” (ibid.).  
He asks how scenes and paramount reality are constructed. The 
answer is that it is the result of indexical play between interlocutors, 
which can be a struggle, and may include memory. Such scenes also 
index the context. The indexical may be double since it points to what 
it is, the context, but also to what it is not — the reality — indexing 
reality slips away. The intersubjective analytical third means that two 
interlocutors become subjectively united (Crapanzano 2004: 402). 
Crapanzano does not attempt to propose underlying values that may 
have universal application, as does Lotman. Nor does he deny the 
issue. But his relation to Lotman’s later works, possibly intertextual, is 
marked and of great interest. 
Crapanzano’s references frequently to psychoanalysis. His Third, is 
clearly a broader aspect of Peirce’s Third, with all its varied meanings 
that rule or control the meaning of signs (Crapanzano 2004: 400). 
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Part 5. The post-modern detour  
 
5.1. What “post-modern” means 
 
Bidney rejected total relativism regardless of how difficult and 
unsuccessful is the search for universals. However, this post-modern 
view leads us to the general questioning of traditional methodology. 
The post-modern trend in ethnology had its beginning, some say, as 
early as in the sixties (Rabinow 1986). There is one area at least upon 
which there is general agreement, namely that post-modernism is a 
reaction to the disillusionment of modernism with the rationalism and 
optimism that has dominated Western thinking since the Enlighten-
ment and the sense that accurate representations are not possible. 
They are infected with and rooted in relations of power. But such a 
negative view is not shared by the semiotic world. Accurate repre-
sentations are imperfect but the goal is not impossible and should be a 
central aim.    
What post-modernism means is a reverberating question, and in a 
positive sense it directs us to a questioning of ethnological methods, 
alerting ethnologists to the fact that they are writing stories, and that 
the written narrative cannot directly mirror the raw data since it is 
infected with the ethnologist’s own perspective, and furthermore from 
the point of view of the actors themselves there is never a unitary point 
of view or voice, which is also the message of Bahtin’s heteroglossia.   
One effect has been the severe reassessment of the writing of 
ethnology itself (Clifford, Marcus 1986). Some go so far as to advocate 
that writing relies on self-critical reflexivity, free floating signifiers 
loosened from their signifieds, pastiche, montage, tropes, dialogue, 
heteroglossia, quotation, traces, as opposed to history or memory or 
even nostalgia. Additionally, important to post-modernists are the 
notions of meta-commentary, allegory and irony, critiques of other 
ethnological writings, revised conceptions of the other as a dynamic 
part of the depiction, and avoidance of an absent ethereal voice, 
reliance on rhetoric and also on a journalistic mode. But this raises the 
problem that ethnological studies are seen as a kind of fiction, as 
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plotted narratives and thus relative and unique. Then comparisons 
between cultures (one of the guide posts of anthropology) are not 
useful. Rabinow (1986) and Crapanzano (1990, 1992b) reject the 
reduction of ethnological studies to fiction, rhetoric, or journalism, 
and insist on inclusion of context, history, and power relations. They 
reject total relativism that rules out even the most abstract invariables 
and thus the view of incommensurability of cultures. 
The journal Cultural Anthropology, founded in 1986, opens with 
the following remark by its editor, Marcus (1986: 3): “A particular 
model of theory and practice has been disrupted — that of the para-
digm, described by Thomas Kuhn, in which research proceeds under a 
regime of a recognized set of problems and networks”. While Kuhn’s 
insights into the difference between cultural paradigms are very 
valuable (Kuhn 1996 [1962]), he also falls into the trap of incom-
mensurability since each paradigm is viewed as unique and having 
nothing in common with its part.  
In his introduction to Perilous States, Marcus (1993: 1) calls for a 
manner of writing more evocative of journalism. He is concerned 
about the ferment in cultural studies, and is searching for new and 
immediate ways for contact and understandings, and contrasts his 
suggestions with what he calls “text-based practices of analysis, pre-
ferring a more immediate form of reportage since such a mode, he 
senses, will also address the documentary impulse of cultural studies 
with its hypercriticism of representation (Marcus 1993: 3). Thus 
Marcus believes that he is escaping from textualization and that 
anthropologists’ tendency to rely on “rational, detached reflective 
reason” hinders “more direct access to other’s situated frameworks 
and discourses” (Marcus 1993: 4). However, a semiotic approach to 
culture, diverse as it is, takes a distinct path from past evidence. It does 
not reject history, reason, rationalism and detached reflective reason, 
and defends direct access to data.   
The following are some remarks by Crapanzano about the post-
modern position. The post-modernist prediction that meta-narratives 
are dead does not prevent from taking an extra-textual stance. “It does 
put into question the taking of an extra-territorial position of 
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accepting the narrative” and “[…] the move to the meta level is […] 
the foreclusion […] of the purported subject matter of the com-
mentary” (Crapanzano 1990: 303). The original subject, in this view, 
“becomes an empty signifier that serves a pragmatic function — the 
preservation of the metaframe, or, in the now fashionable questioning 
of that frame, the metaframe” (ibid.). Going farther, Crapanzano 
observes that the writing school of ethnography has created or 
conferred its own canon (Crapanzano 1990: 303). For the dichotomy 
fiction/nonfiction is itself a historical and culturally specific oppo-
sition involving particular notions of narrative and representation. 
Ethnography is not simply description but is comparative. It has a 
creative and epistemological effect (Crapanzano 1990: 305) and the 
ethnographer may be likened to a trickster without the modernist 
irony (Crapanzano 1990: 306). Abandoning the ethereal authority in 
experimental ethnography is only an illusion. “It has its own appeal. It 
precipitates (its) reality. Text and reality are always implicated in each 
other and appropriate anthropological distance must be maintained” 
(Crapanzano 1990: 307). Crapanzano’s analysis of reality and rejection 
of total relativism echoes the mind-set of Searle, Lotman and his group.   
As Crapanzano comments, the “barren artifice” as is invented by the 
post-modern writers is structured like parody and argues it “both 
incorporates and challenges that which it parodies” (Crapanzano 1992b: 
87–88). He notes that most post-modern definitions are vague, contra-
dictory, and general (Crapanzano 1992b: 88) but they frequently stress 
reflexivity carrying this position so far that there can be no external 
vantage point. “We are caught within the play of arbitrary signs that are 
loosened from their referents and no longer systematically constrained 
by grammars of style, say, or narrative. […] The concatenation of signs 
becomes an ironic montage (Crapanzano 1992b: 88).  
 
 
5.2. Searle’s critique of post-modernism and relativism 
 
In his book, The Construction of Social Reality (1995), the philosopher 
John Searle analyzes reality, questioning the post-modern critique of 
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cultural research. Searle considers the status of objective facts that are 
only facts by human agreement, existing only because we believe them 
to exist, to be real, not fiction. A five dollar bill, a piece of property that 
we own, are some examples, in contrast to Mt. Everest, the existence of 
which is independent of human experience. Thus institutional facts, 
dependent on human agreement, are contrasted to non-institutional 
facts, namely brute facts.  
Searle (1995: iix) wishes to defend and further the position that 
there is a reality totally independent of us (Searle 1995: 2). He aban-
dons dualism of mind/body. Mind is a higher level feature of the brain 
and is both mental and physical. Culture is constructed of nature. 
Searle distinguishes reality from theory of truth which is a complex, 
philosophical argument based on his theory of correspondence which 
we cannot outline here. Lotman also grapples with what Searle calls 
truth, how the brain functions, and how it relates to concepts of time 
and space and worldview. Searle explains that with consciousness 
comes the possibility of intentionality — that is, the capacity of the 
mind to represent objects and states of the world other than ourselves 
(Searle 1995: 7).  
 
 
Searle’s concept of “background” 
 
The concept of “background” for Searle refers to the set of non-
intentional or pre-intentional capacities that enable intentional states 
to function. “The key to understanding causal relations between 
structure of the background and structure of social relations is to see 
that the background can be causally sensitive to the specific beliefs or 
desires or representations of those rules” (Searle 1995: 141). “Back-
ground” can be compared to Crapanzano’s “scene”, since here, too, 
memory and background are causative and knowledge and abilities 
that are generally known are not part of intentionality “but are the 
necessary preconditions for the functioning of intentional concepts” 
(Searle 1995: 133). Background functions in facilitating linguistic 
interpretation and perceptual interpretation that are extended to 
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consciousness. According to Searle “the understanding of utterances 
and the experiencing of ordinary conscious states requires background 
capacities” (Searle 1995: 135). Crapanzano shows that from back-
ground to intentional states it is not necessary to involve rules since 
the latter may be unconscious dispositions. This general view of the 
flexibility of rules may be related to innovative and creative behavior 
about which Searle hints in some comments in his book.   
This is a defense of context and unconscious underlying norms or 
dispositions that are formative in creating culture. Those who do not 
agree with the autonomy of cultural realism, and who hold that reality 
is but a social construct such as anti-realism, versions of post-struc-
turalisms, deconstruction, according to Searle, are taking positions 
against all common sense views (Searle 1995: 15).  
Searle’s importance for culture is the systemic support of the social 
reality that cultural system, beliefs, and norms share, as opposed to the 
post-modern position that such cultural habits and practices are pure 
constructs. Lotman’s and Wolf’s positions are of course congruent 
with Searle’s, as is also Crapanzano’s emphasis on imagination and the 
aesthetic that also have a place in cultural reality. This leaves the 
question of the individual creator who is not understood perhaps even 
in his lifetime, but understood long after. We must assume that the 
individual creator is constructing some aspects of social reality for the 
future if his creation is eventually to be understood and interpreted by 
some other. 
 
 
Part 6. The semiotics of culture and its roots and 
evolution in the 21st century 
 
6.1. Boas as the beginning and his unending relevance 
 
To set the parameters, I quote Baker’s view that Boas took us out of 
the ivory tower. Baker discusses the ways Boas’ writing and research a 
century ago is being deployed and used in today’s “public arena” (Ba-
ker 2004).   
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I look at Boas as a crusader unlimited by time-based chronology 
and by space. I also consider Boas’ import as largely misunderstood 
even today as he does not receive the attention he should. He was at 
home in all fields of anthropology and more. In his book, Change in 
Bodily Form of Descendence of Immigrants (Boas 1912), Boas 
demonstrated that head size was significantly determined by environ-
ment (Stocking 1974: 180–90, cited in Baker 2004: 1). Boas’ ideal 
laboratory was the diversity of immigrants and their exclusiveness as 
workers in Manchester’s factories. Although he was attacked for this 
finding, holding that the results were genetic, Boas’ findings have been 
established as correct.  
In spite of enemies and popular anger, Boas succeeded in pre-
senting a paper at the 1911 AAAS, entitled Bases of Primitive Man 
where he held that there were no pure races, and intelligence tests 
were fallacious and misleading. He also demolished “false arm-chair” 
evolution in relation to art and language. He fearlessly destroyed 
anthropological myths and showed that his empirical method 
demonstrated facts as opposed to fairy stories. He did not uphold 
static theories and held that events moved with the times. American 
anthropology began in a hectic mantra, and Boas’ path-breaking 
positions are important today and have no end. Though he was 
incorrectly criticized as being anti-historical and anti-theoretical this 
was not at all justified. His Mind of Primitive Man (1911) and 
Primitive Art (1927) have become classics. He held that art in various 
forms was universal and he did not move on linear evolutionary tracks. 
Similarly, Levi-Strauss found that science in primitive societies was 
also universal but did not follow an exact path and was based on local 
factors in the environment and bricolage, simply what was available to 
the creative mind.   
After Boas as well as his leading students, Benedict and Mead, 
there was a period of general neglect of its famous founders. Since 
anthropology settled down to descriptive and incorrect evolutionist 
theories, with the partial exception of Kroeber, following the Boas 
period, there was a general fragmentation and decline in anthro-
pological scholarship, but later also some explorations and new direc-
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tions, which I have described (Geertz, Crapanzano, Turner), and 
which suggest interrelations with semiotic approaches.  
I turn now to some fundamental concepts of semiotics of culture 
and recent developments in semiotics.  
 
 
6.2. Deely sees semiotics for the twenty-first century 
 
His study outlines  
 
A unified treatise laying out the basics behind the very idea of semiotic 
inquiry in general, a treatise providing a map of semiosis as an integral 
phenomenon (it being understood that semiosis is but the name for the 
action of signs, which provides the common subject matter for the 
whole range of inquiries covered by the umbrella term “semiotics” 
(Deely 1990: xxix).  
 
Kull (1990: ix–xxv) quotes Deely who states that knowledge is defi-
nitely in the twenty-first century in the post-modern age. Kull points 
out that semiotics may be defined in multiple ways. He traces 
historical developments before Peirce and Jakob von Uexküll and 
important earlier traces. According to Kull, Lotman believes that 
semiotics is not meant for those not familiar with some other field of 
study. Some see semiotics as binding together the methodologies of 
the humanities and all theoretical bases for all qualitative approaches 
and as the emperor of all quantitative science such as physics.  
The Theses on the Semiotic Study of Cultures as applied Slavic texts 
(Uspenskij et al. 1973) which laid out broad new programs of the 
Lotman group, outlined the development of semiotics toward diversity 
and heterogeneity (Uspenskij et al. 1973: 4). It contains the following 
formative statement: 
 
The pursuit of heterogeneity of languages is a characteristic feature of 
culture. Heterogeneity, in its turn, enables us to perceive scientific 
analysis not just as departing from a single unified viewpoint, but as 
consisting of a system of perspectives within which each scholar who 
studies culture has to start by explicitly identifying his or her point of 
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departure. The disciplines and scholars studying culture therefore 
constitute a heterogeneous collection of viewpoints within which efforts 
have to be made in order to relate different perspectives to one another, 
to allow them to interact and to unify them methodologically. As a 
semiotic system, research will at some point develop a need for a 
generalized description of itself. (Uspenskij et al. 1973: 20) 
 
In Lotman’s words, “The highest form of structured organization of a 
semiotic system is the phase of self-description. The process of 
description itself completes structural organization” (Lotman 1996: 
170). If this structural organization does not cause stagnation, but 
retains its natural diversity and prospects for further development, as 
exemplified by Deely’s book, then organization means movement 
towards understanding and change.  
In his article Humans and signs (1969), Lotman writes the fol-
lowing: 
 
It [science] often takes that what seemed so simple and clear and 
discovers complexity and uncertainty there. Science does not always 
make the unknown known, it often behaves in a completely opposite 
manner. In the end, science does not always aim at providing as many 
answers as possible, instead if departs from the assumption that the 
right way of posing the question and the correct course of argument 
embody greater value than ready-made answers even if they are right 
but have not been controlled (Lotman 1969: 6). 
 
The article concludes with some semiotic issues. Following Peirce’s 
idea of synechism, semiosis can include lifeless processes according to 
Deely (1990), reflecting emergence of later scientific theories beyond 
Peirce’s lifetime and discussed by Eco and Sebeok, holding that this 
discussion must be left open (Lotman 1969: 4).  
This discussion leads us to touch on biosemiotics which I only 
briefly describe since it is beyond the purview of this study, but which 
is ineluctably a part of semiotics of the hemisphere so I digress here to 
look at this issue.  
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6.3. Global semiotics, biosemiotics 
 
The concepts of the semiosphere and of global semiotics according to 
Kull, Petrilli and Ponzio and the implications of Lotman and Deely, 
bring us to the complex area of biosemiotics. What is biosemiotics? 
Hoffmeyer writes: 
 
It was only in the last decade of the twentieth century that the words 
began to proliferate in the international literature (Sebeok and Umiker-
Sebeok 1992). According to the biosemiotic perspective, living nature is 
understood as essentially driven by, or actually consisting of, semiosis, 
that is to say, processes of sign relations and their signification — or 
function — in he biological processes of life. (Hoffmeyer 2008: 4) 
 
According to biosemiotician Claus Emmeche: 
 
Biosemiotics proper deals with sign processes in nature in all 
dimensions, including (1) the emergence of semiosis in nature, which 
may coincide with or anticipate the emergence of living cells; (2) the 
natural history of signs; (3) the ‘horizontal’ aspect of semiosis in the 
ontogeny of organisms, in plant and animal communication, and in 
inner sign functions in the immune and nervous systems; and (4) the 
semiotics of cognition and language. (Emmeche 1992: 78) 
 
Thus, signs do not distinguish between nature and culture. Living sys-
tems originate in molecular processes but molecular processes cannot 
be exhaustively described in chemical terms. This position is anchored 
in the evolutionary philosophy of Peirce. There is the issue of whether 
lifeless phenomena are also a part of the semiosphere which is deba-
table (Hoffmeyer 2008: 5).   
According to Hoffmeyer, early advocates of biosemiotics investi-
gation also included Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1942), and to some ex-
tent concepts of Bateson (1904–1981).  
The article Bioethics, semiotics of life, and global communication by 
Augusto Ponzio and Susan Petrilli (2001) proceeds to other dimen-
sions. We see the extension of semiotics to the global sphere, we “must 
accept the responsibility of denouncing incongruities in the global 
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system, any threats to life extending over the entire planet inherent in 
the system” (Ponzio, Petrilli 2001: 263).  
According to Ponzio and Petrilli, bioethics belongs to two totalities 
(Ponzio, Petrilli 2001: 263), the semiosphere and global commu-
nication, and the biosphere. The writers call for viewing bioethical 
problems in socioeconomic contexts that is global communication 
production (Ponzio, Petrilli 2001: 263). They extend Lotman’s semio-
sphere to include the biosphere, or semiobiosphere, and semiotics of 
life (Ponzio, Petrilli 2001: 264). They see globalization as tantamount 
to heavy interference by communication and production to life in 
general (Ponzio, Petrilli 2001: 268). It is destructive (Ponzio, Petrilli 
2001: 269). They outline the now well-known deterioration of the 
riches of the planet, the dangers of human life. 
Petrilli and Ponzio have written widely on semiotics of culture 
expanding on the thesis of semiotics of life, carrying semiotics to a 
new level, that of relevance and application to the world, ethics and 
political consciousness, and this must be continued. This is a most 
important contribution. We need to view bioethics in the context of 
global production and communication. They are related from the 
point of view of ethics. They point to the destructiveness of the 
universalization of the communication in the production system 
market which impedes and distorts communication. It destroys 
traditional cultural practices held in the way of development. This 
article brings up the problem that ethics cannot be limited to exploi-
tation and economics, but mental suffering, including the effect on the 
arts and literature. 
 
 
1. Kalevi Kull 
 
Kull in his article Semiosphere and the dual ecology (2005a) compares 
two types of sciences: semiotics and physics. Physics studies a single, 
physical reality repeatedly and whereas there are many semiotic 
realities that are looked upon as brought upon by one individual, they 
are unique. The semiosphere is defined as the space of qualitative (in-
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commensurable) diversity (Kull 2005a). Therefore, there is a paradox. 
Diversity, a creation of communication, can also be destructive to 
excessive communication. Kull quotes Hoffmeyer (1999: 153; in Kull 
2005a: 176), “model building is at the core of semiotics and natural 
sciences. Models are the sum of their building blocks but are […] 
complex signs occurring in organisms”. Kull argues that “under-
standing from a semiotic point of view […] requires instead a conti-
nuous interchange between contradicting models” (Kull 2005a: 176). 
There is a problem, however, with this position since cultures may 
be partially incommensurable but hardly entirely — which is one of 
the basic studies in ethnology. The underlying unities may be too 
abstract for sign theses but nevertheless, they must be investigated. 
The solution to the paradox is in Socrates’ dialogue, Kull argues.  
Kull tells us that according to Lotman’s formulation, there is 
always more than one text and more than one code. Code duality is a 
basic feature of the semiosphere, a term that refers to “the space of 
meaning generation” (Kull 2005a: 177). There is only one way to 
create meaning and that is via multiple simultaneous descriptions 
(Kull 2005a: 177). Semiosphere is the region of multiple realities and 
multiple worlds (Kull 2005a: 180) that together form one single reality. 
Both physics and semiotics are types of descriptions (Kull 2005a: 182). 
Both aim to study everything in the world and any phenomenon can 
be studied both physically and semiotically. Semiotics is the study in 
terms of semiotic space and emerging meanings (Kull 2005a: 182).   
 
 
2. Diversity 
 
Kull argues that following Gregory Bateson, information is “difference 
that makes a difference. Semiosphere is where distinctions occur or 
where distinctions are made. Thus, semiosphere is the space of 
qualitative diversity” (Kull 2005a: 179). One difference between the 
human and the non-human world is the interest in survival. Orga-
nisms cannot be aware of their own death (Kull 2005a: 185). Com-
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munication is the creation of diversity, but too much communication 
leads to the loss of diversity (Kull 2005a: 186).   
Diversity is the power of evolution. Thus, according to Kull’s 
Semiotics is a theory of life (2005b), biosemiotics as an approach to the 
whole living world begins with Darwin’s Origin of Species (1859) but it 
has medieval roots. He replaces Darwin’s model of the tree with a new 
model — the web model (von Uexküll, Wesiack 1997). 
In Kull’s Copy versus translate, meme versus sign (2000), Kull 
shows that biological events at the lowest common denominator are 
not static. As opposed to standard copying in biological genetics, 
biological development involves change in usage of the gene (Kull 
2000: 4). Epigenetic can be first and gene shift follows. This is not 
natural selection, since the organism itself selects the appropriate 
genetic functional genome which will be later fixed by stochastic 
genetic processes (Kull 2000: 4). Kull writes that according to Stanley 
Salthe and David J. Depew, development, not evolution could be 
considered as the central framework as biology; natural selection 
contrasts with evolutionary development.  
 
 
3. Translating or interpreting the genotype 
 
As Kull continues, if the phenotype is further used for production of 
the next genotype, then the phenotype is a process, a developing 
organism. “The genome does not determine the phenotype, but […] 
the organism interprets its genome when producing phenotype” (Kull 
2000: 7). Emergences of new features of organisms can appear due to 
changes in inheritance or system or environment. It is not DNA that 
specifies the feature of the organism. Identical DNA may vary in gene 
expression (Kull 2000: 4). This is a far more dynamic turn on the 
traditional genetic system contributing to complex change which is 
central to semiotics of culture. Bringing the discussion into the 
domain of semiotics of culture and discussing Lotman, Kull contrasts 
the non-textual and the textual approaches (Kull 2000: 10). Text is not 
a structure but a process, and has semiotic features more fundamental 
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than a message, which could at times be just simple organic or 
inorganic molecules. Historicity, intentionality, and intertextuality are 
features of all texts. Signs are seen as living entities and semiosis is 
identical to the process of living. Sign or text is always connected to a 
living system. Culture is a living system. Culture is also a text, 
according to Lotman, but never a single language. Culture is 
composed of a complex of texts (Lotman 1984).  
Memes, copying a term used by Peirce, are degenerate signs. They 
can only be copies. Objects of copying are memes. Objects of 
translation are signs. Darwinian fundamentalism, according to Steven 
J. Gould, is neo-Darwinism. We need both sides — natural selection 
biology (copying) and semiotic biology (translation). There is no 
border between the semiotic and the non-semiotic world. The aim is 
to find steps between the worlds. Signs grow. Living systems have 
“aliveness”.  
 
 
6.4. Concluding remarks — Lotman the Maestro 
 
Torop’s article (2005: 159–170) on the semiosphere contains much 
information about Lotman’s book, Culture and Explosion (2009), 
which has just become available in English. I will discuss what we 
know about Lotman’s last book in reviews and quotations as stated in 
Torop’s article, as well as comments in other Lotman publications. 
Torop holds that “The Semiosphere […] brings semiotics of culture 
into contact with its history […] and with the newest phenomena in 
culture” (Torop 2005: 159). According to Ivanov (1998: 792), “the 
semiosphere is placed between the biosphere and the noosphere”.  
According to the review of Lotman’s Culture and Explosion, “A shift in 
the paradigms of the semiotics of culture” by Deltcheva and Vlasov 
(1996: 148–152), the semiosphere is both based on an object and a 
metaconcept. “We live in a world based on the conjectural unity of 
two models” (art and science) (Lotman in Torop 1999: 13–14). As 
Lotman writes, “no method of description rules out another method of 
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description. It is as if their reciprocal tension creates a third point of 
view” (Lotman in Torop 2000: 14–15).    
According to a conversation with Lotman that Torop quoted, 
Lotman held that “the fate of people, history, accomplishments of 
science is unpredictable. [….] Unpredictability […] whose mecha-
nisms is one of the most important objects of science, introduces into 
science a totally new manner, the component of art” (Lotman in 
Torop 2000: 16). 
As I’ve noted, after Boas, history was largely neglected for a long 
period. Yet, history does its part in the dynamics of culture. Here one 
thinks of Wolf, also Kroeber, but Kroeber’s history was isolated from 
the full meaning of culture as long as he separated nature and culture. 
The impoverishment of history is partly owed to the functionalists, 
such as early Malinowski, and the misunderstanding and misinter-
pretations of Boas. Boas insisted on empirical grounds for history. 
Obviously it was difficult to obtain historical data from primitives who 
were nonliterate, but Boas searched for evidence of historical data 
when he could through memory, ritual, and life passage events, etc. He 
rejected the pseudo-evolutionary history of the followers of Morgan, 
and the misunderstanding of Darwin, which was an important critique 
of American anthropology.   
Lotman saw film as an important dialogical and dynamic area for 
semiotic studies (Lotman 1976). He detected a system of distinctive 
features in film, and attempted to analyze the text on the basis of 
markedness and unmarkedness. In his article, Cultural semiotics and 
the notion of text, Lotman replaced the text with the notion of com-
munication, communication between addressee and addresser, 
between the audience and cultural tradition, between the reader and 
his or herself, between the reader with the text, between the text and 
cultural tradition (Torop 2005: 167). Discussing cultural dynamics, 
Lotman saw cultural language as interwoven into discrete and conti-
nual entities (iconic and spatial dynamism). According to Lotman, 
meaning generation is the ability of culture as a whole and its parts to 
avoid trivial texts that are to a certain degree already predictable 
(Lotman cited in Torop 2005: 169).  
Facing emergences: Past traces and new directions in American anthropology  159
According to the reviewers of Lotman’s book, Culture and Explo-
sion (2009 [1992]), culture as a “semiotic construct cannot only be 
observed and described but also governed and guided” (Deltcheva, 
Vlasov 1996: 148). Culture as a modeling system can influence 
external reality. They point out that there are two issues in Culture and 
Explosion, one the relation of statics and dynamics, and the second the 
relation between system and beyond the system (Deltcheva, Vlasov 
1996: 148). To what extent can the cultural sphere correspond to the 
world beyond its boundaries, the world of nature, and to what extent 
can one transpose “the conceptual world of language system onto 
language-independent reality”? (Deltcheva, Vlasov 1996: 148). For 
Lotman, it is necessary to have at least two languages to carry out this 
exploration. “Evolution in the cultural semiosphere has two basic 
manifestations, continuous and punctuated. Continuous can be de-
fined as premeditated predictability” (Deltcheva, Vlasov 1996: 149). 
Explosion is characterized by unpredictability and sudden change, and 
can coexist also with gradual evolution. Information is conceived at a 
moment of explosion. (Deltcheva, Vlasov 1996: 149).   
According to Lotman, it is possible to conjoin the unconjoinable 
under the impact of some creative tension either rationally or emotio-
nally beyond the domain of logic. The rational-irrational side of crea-
tive tension exemplifies the complex interaction between translatable 
and untranslatable, facilitating the penetration into extra-lingual 
reality. Extra-lingual reality acquires the status of “absolute truth” to 
its culture carriers, yet we ascribe to language lies (Deltcheva, Vlasov 
1996: 149). At some point they are reinstated into the semiosphere as 
new structural entities (Deltcheva, Vlasov 1996: 149).   
According to the reviewers, art, as a primary building block of 
culture, functions as a domain of freedom, making the impossible 
possible. Furthermore, Lotman’s model of evolution “in which the 
unpredictability of the extra-temporal explosion is constantly trans-
formed in human consciousness into the predictability of the 
dynamics it generates and vice-versa” (Lotman 2009: 158). There is no 
final goal, the universe is inexhaustible.  
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At the center of the model he positions the Creative personality 
conducting a great experiment, the results of which are unexpected and 
unpredictable even for the Creator. This approach allows us to perceive 
the universe as an inexhaustible source of information. (Deltcheva, 
Vlasov 1996: 151)  
 
In opposition to the linear model, Lotman introduces a third apex which 
compensates the tension between the two existing extremes and 
transforms it into a volumetric structure. The transformation of the 
two-dimensional plane into a three-dimensional semiosphere expands 
the areas towards which the development of culture can be oriented. 
(Deltcheva, Vlasov 1996: 151)  
 
There is a constant interaction between culture and extra-culture, the 
semiosphere and the extra semiotic space. Lotman “presents a 
functional perspective on culture in its dependence on space outside 
the boundaries of art” (Deltcheva, Vlasov 1996: 149). The reviewers 
state that naturalization of a foreign cultural element is complicated 
on the level of language through the mechanism of naming (Deltcheva, 
Vlasov 1996: 150). Explosion does not mean infinite potentialities. 
Gradual evolution is not static either. Gradual explosion generates 
new meanings.  
There is an alternation between explosion and gradual evolution. 
Art is a reflection of reality (Hegel’s positivism). On the other hand, 
art as an antithetical life (neo-romanticism) embodies antinomy: art 
“makes possible not only that which is forbidden but also that which is 
deemed impossible” (Lotman 2009: 150). Lotman also asserts that the 
relation aesthetic/ethical is the basic model of culture. If the aesthetic 
approach rejects the ethical reading of art, the ethical reading becomes 
more stable. The relation between aesthetic and ethical, or between art 
and morality, is the basic model of culture. The  
 
very resolution, with which aesthetics denies the inevitability of the 
ethical interpretation of art; that very energy, which is expended on 
similar proofs, is the best confirmation of their stability. The ethical and 
the aesthetical are opposites and are inseparable as the two poles of art. 
The relation between art and morals echoes the common fate of 
oppositions in the structure of culture. (Lotman 2009: 151)  
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The individual, through art, can experience the artistic world as a 
mental experiment in which the forbidden zones of reality can be 
inspected. “A sharp increase in the level of freedom in relation to 
reality makes art an experimental pole. Art creates its own world, one 
which is constructed as a transformation of non-artistic reality 
according to the law: ‘if, then…’ (Lotman 2009: 151). In commenting 
on Lotman’s Culture and Explosion, Deltcheva and Vlasov (1996: 150–
151) write: 
 
The very nature of the artistic world establishes the possibility to 
experience before its actual experiencing in non-artistic reality. The 
mental experiment precedes the historical experiment and is based on 
the formula “explosion plus gradual evolution.” The very essence of 
explosion determines the unpredictability of the process, simultaneously 
ensuring its inexhaustibility and unfinalizability. The outcomes of 
historical experiment, on the other hand, can be predicted, since they 
are based on analytical data of non-experimental, factual information. 
Historical experiment rejects the notion of the accidental and establishes 
a unidirectional evolutionary channel oriented towards a finite goal. 
This scheme presents God as the Great Master who performs a chain of 
events known to him in advance…Art can be defined as the dichotomy 
of the text and the boundary of the text. 
 
Lotman sees art as constantly struggling to overcome boundaries. His 
model replaces Hegel’s linear evolution. The universe is an inexhaus-
tible source of information and there is no finite goal (Deltcheva, 
Vlasov 1996: 151). In opposition to the linear model, Lotman intro-
duces a third apex, which expands the area in which culture is oriented, 
“which compensates between the two existing entities, transforms it 
into a volumetric structure” (Deltcheva, Vlasov 1996: 157). The two 
models of evolution both have explosions that are obligatory, but in 
binary explosion the result is annihilation. Death is the only outcome 
(Deltcheva, Vlasov 1996: 151). Ternary explosion is a momentary 
eruption, characterized not by unidirectionality but by alternativity. In 
a ternary system, the result is defused. It neutralizes the destructive 
aspects of the explosion, amortizing and preserving the system from 
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total destruction by accommodating the ideal to reality and guaran-
teeing the infinity of evolutionary processes.  
 
In ternary social structures even the most powerful and deep explosions 
are not sufficient to encompass the entirety of the complex richness of 
social layers. The core structure can survive an explosion so powerful 
and catastrophic that its echo can be heard through all the levels of 
culture. (Lotman 2009: 166)  
 
Here Lotman applies his concepts to the present world. The world 
mistrusts explosions (such as nuclear). If explosion is integrated into 
the ternary structure, it could be a positive, creative force. The ternary 
system of the West, Lotman predicts, is coming to be accepted by 
Russia rather than the binary, destructive system.  
Lotman concludes with a hopeful optimism, namely that  
 
The radical change in relations between Eastern and Western Europe, 
which is taking place before our very eyes may, perhaps, provide us with 
the opportunity to pass into a ternary, Pan-European system and to 
forego the ideal of destroying “the old world to its very foundations, and 
then” constructing a new one on its ruins. To overlook this possibility 
would be a historical catastrophe. (Lotman 2009: 174) 
 
Lotman’s hopeful comment, a wishful optimism leaves us with the 
respect for his wisdom but tinged with irony for today.  
I conclude that acceptance of multiple realities does not mean that 
we must accept relativism as a final statement, and that we cannot 
continue to search for underlying universals. Moreover, we can accept 
and investigate concepts such as binarism and the heteroglossia of 
Bahtin. Lotman’s semiosphere and beyond implies that space is so vast 
that we can continue to search for many realities. The universal 
human delight in art, music, and dance does not prove that these 
abilities are due to evolutionary survival of the fittest, for they have 
many functions and meanings. In this paper I have discussed why we 
need Bidney’s insights and Lotman’s open-ended vision of semiotics 
of culture, both of which embrace all forms of communication and 
reject borders that falsely enclose realities and limit thought and 
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imagination. These scholars decry reductionism, oversimplification, 
and narrow-minded rejection of those questions too difficult to 
answer, all of which fail to lead us to new truths. They uphold instead 
the questioning minds that drive humans on in the search for all 
aspects of reality. 
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Тропы прошлого и новые дороги в американской антропологии 
(или зачем антропологии нужна семиотика культуры) 
 
В статье описывается положение в американской антропологии, 
основоположником которой является Франц Боас, который работал 
во всех областях антропологии: в физической, культурной и со-
циальной антропологии. Боас был храбрым полевым работником, 
который изучал жизнь эскимосов и вдохновил своих знаменитых 
учениц — Рут Бенедикт и Маргарет Мид — перейти существующие 
границы и заняться исследованиями нового типа. После этих 
выдающихся личностей американская антропология оказалась вновь 
во власти линеарного описательного позитивизма, поверхностных 
сравнений квантитативных черт культуры и ложных эволюционных 
схем, которые были неспособны познакомить нас с внутренними 
мирами и характером исследуемых народов. Что стало со значением, 
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мечтами, поэзией, воображением, ценностями и самоопределения-
ми? Исследование философа Дэвида Бидни 1953 года является в этом 
смысле откровением. Бидни озвучил и развеял все мои сомнения по 
части направлений в антропологии, и его работа является в каком-то 
смысле сводной моделью нарратива американской антропологии. Не 
читая работ Юрия Лотмана, Бидни в своих работах набросал идеи 
семиотики культуры Лотмана. В статье я пытаюсь описать по следам 
Бидни ложные представления в антропологии и показать,  как эти 
ошибки частично преодолевались в некоторых более поздних антро-
пологических исследованиях, которые занимались символизмом, 
работой художника и субъективными качествами исследуемых. Да-
лее я пытаюсь дать обзор школы, основанной Лотманом, объект 
исследования которой охватывает человеческое поведение в его 
целостности, демонстрирует сложность значения и коммуникации 
на очень широком материале — от искусства и литературы до науки 
и философии, и отказывается от жесткого релятивизма и закрытых 
систем. Школа Лотмана вдохновляет всех, кто хочет, чтобы антро-
пология охватывала как себя, так и Другое и бахтинское двойное 
значение. Бидни вдохновил данную статью, как призыв изучить все 
возможные миры, — не отказаться от науки и реальности, а изучить 
глубинные связи и важнейшую роль эстетического фактора в дебрях 
коммуникации.  
 
 
Silmitsi eriolukordadega: minevikurajad ja uued suunad ameerika 
antropoloogias (ehk miks ameerika antropoloogial on vaja 
kultuurisemiootikat) 
  
Käesolev artikkel räägib sellest, mis on saanud ameerika antropoloogiast, 
millele pani aluse Franz Boas, kes tegeles kõigi antropoloogia liikidega: 
füüsilise, bioloogilise ja kultuurantropoloogiaga. Boas oli vapper väli-
tööline, kes uuris eskimote alasid ning inspireeris oma kahte kuulsat 
õpilast — Ruth Benedicti ja Margaret Meadi — uut sorti uuringutes üle 
kehtivate piiride astuma. Peale neid säravaid kujusid vajuti taas lineaarse 
kirjeldava positivismi, kvantitatiivsete kultuurijoonte pealiskaudsete võrd-
luste ja väärate evolutsiooniliste skeemide rüppe, mis ei tutvustanud meile 
ei uurimisaluste rahvaste sisemisi maailmu ega iseloomu. Mis sai tähen-
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dusest, unistustest, luulest, kujutlusvõimest, väärtustest ja enesemääratlus-
test? Filosoof David Bidney 1953. aasta uurimus oli selles mõttes ilmu-
tuslik. Bidney sõnastas ja hajutas kõik mu kahtlused antropoloogia suun-
dade osas ning tema töö toimib teatud mõttes ameerika antropoloogia 
narratiivi koondmudelina. Bidney visandas päris mitmes aspektis Lot-
mani kultuurisemiootika ideid, olemata Lotmani töid loomulikult luge-
nud. Käesolevas artiklis üritan kirjeldada eksiarvamusi antropoloogias, 
mille Bidney defineeris, ning näidata, kuidas neist eksiarvamustest on osa-
liselt jagu saadud mõnedes hilisemates antropoloogilistes uurimustes, mis 
keskendusid sümbolismile, kunstnikutööle ja uurimisaluste inimeste sub-
jektiivsetele omadustele. Seejärel üritan anda, nii hästi kui võimalik, 
ülevaadet Lotmani koolkonnast, mille uurimisobjekt hõlmab kogu inim-
käitumist, demonstreerib tähenduse ja kommunikatsiooni keerukust väga 
laialdase materjali peal kunstist ja kirjandusest teaduse ning filosoofiani 
välja, ning mis ütles lahti rangest relativismist ja suletud süsteemidest. 
Lotmani koolkond on inspiratsiooniks kõigile neile, kes tahavad, et antro-
poloogia hõlmaks nii ennast kui Teist ja ka Bahtini topelttähendust. 
Bidney oli käesoleva artikli inspiratsiooniks kui üleskutse uurimaks laie-
malt kõiki võimalikke maailmu — mitte hülgama teadust ja reaalsust, vaid 
uurima sügavamaid sisemisi seoseid ning esteetilise faktori ülimalt tähtsat 
rolli kommunikatsiooni keerdkäikudes.  
